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ABSTRACT 
Purpose 
In an effort to further explain why manufacturing firms that move towards service provision often 
fail to achieve the financial benefits they would expect, the purpose of this paper is to examine 
empirically the impact of service provision on the bankruptcy risks facing manufacturing firms. 
Methodology 
Using data drawn from a sample 129 bankrupt manufacturers (75 servitized and 54 non-servitized) 
and a framework categorising bankruptcy risks, the study explores the relationship between service 
provision and the environmental (external) and internal bankruptcy risks that manufacturing firms 
face. 
Findings 
The study finds that the presence of a service business leads to a greater number of bankruptcy risks 
for the supplying firm. This is essentially because of greater internal risks. In addition, two types of 
service offerings are identified – demand chain and product support services. When firms offer 
demand chain services, they are also exposed to greater environmental (external) risks. 
Research limitations/implications 
The study provides empirical evidence about the relationship between servitization and bankruptcy 
risks, and on how this is influenced by the type of services offered. The research could be extended 
through a more comprehensive assessment of organisational risks in order to further validate and 
develop its conclusions. 
Practical implications 
The study suggests that, as adding services introduces new risks for firms, managers have to seek 
means of mitigating these risks to ensure successful introduction of services. 
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Originality/value 
The paper addresses the gap in the literature for structured analyses of the risk consequences of 
service strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
In the manufacturing world, services are in vogue. As markets demand greater customisation and 
faster innovation, academic and management literatures alike suggest that supplementing products 
with value added services can be a profitable option (Neely, 2008; Spring and Araujo, 2013; Wise 
and Baumgartner, 1999).  Especially in developed economies, integrating services into products is 
thought to provide product manufacturers with opportunities for competitive advantage, particularly 
when they offer otherwise undifferentiated products (Gebauer et al., 2011; Matthyssens and 
Vanenbempt, 2010; Mathieu, 2001a; Cusumano et al., 2014).  Service dominant logic (SDL) 
suggests that additional services directly enhance the value of the physical product, which is itself 
viewed as a conduit for delivering service (Vargo and Lusch, 2004).  By virtue of being co-
produced with the customer, services involve customers as operant resources in the co-creation of 
value that is often unique and difficult-to-imitate (Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003; Vargo and Lusch, 
2004; Fang et al., 2008; Gebauer et al., 2011). In addition, services are recognised as a steady 
source of revenues and profit margins that in some industries far exceed the returns of the market 
for physical goods (Wise and Baumgartner, 1999; Gebauer et al., 2005; Raddats and Easingwood, 
2010). Finally, marketing researchers assert that augmenting products with service elements 
increases customer satisfaction and strengthens customer relationships, thereby enhancing customer 
loyalty and retention (Brax, 2005; Gebauer et al., 2006; Johnstone et al., 2009). 
 In this context, the term, servitization, has been introduced to describe a growing propensity 
for manufacturing firms to develop service offerings that extend beyond their traditional core 
product offerings. Manufacturers in a diverse range of industries are servitizing, seeking to increase 
their share of revenues from services.  However, while some companies report that servitization has 
delivered ambitious growth objectives, others appear to struggle to turn a profit from their service 
businesses. A Bain & Co. study indicates that only 21% of companies succeeded with service 
strategies (Baveja et al., 2004). In another study, services are reported to account for only a limited 
percentage of total revenue for the majority of Swiss and German capital goods companies (less 
than 20% for 72% of companies and less 10% for around 39% of companies) (Fischer et al., 2010).  
Stories of failures include many noticeable examples: Siemen’s service division (Siemens Business 
Services) was mostly unprofitable (Gebauer et al., 2009), Intel’s $150 million web-based services 
unit was shut down after few years (Sawhney et al., 2004), and Dürr’s outsourcing service unit 
reined in its efforts to take over its automotive customers’ painting and assembly processes (Fischer 
et al., 2010). Such results suggest that, despite their promise, servitization efforts can fail to 
outperform purer product manufacturing strategies. Indeed, the academic literature has raised a 
‘servitization paradox’ – the value creating opportunities of servitization seem clear, yet the 
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bundling of services with product offerings does not always produce the returns that companies 
expect (Gebauer et al., 2005; Mathyssens and Vanderbempt, 2010; Neely, 2008, Spring and Araujo, 
2013; Ulaga and Loveland, 2014). Given the apparent failures of many servitization programs, 
research is needed that identifies and elucidates factors that relate a service infusion strategy to 
organisational performance. There is good reason to suspect that an important factor is risk.  As a 
manufacturing firm enters new fields of services, it likely changes both the levels and types of risks 
to which it is exposed. While other aspects of service strategies have been intensively studied in the 
literature, concomitant risk consequences have received little empirical attention (Nordin et al, 
2011; Sawhney et al., 2004). 
Managerial literature provides highly valuable insights into the benefits and problems for 
manufacturers of moving towards services. Yet, most studies focus on individual opportunities or 
challenges of service strategies (Spring and Araujo, 2013), leading to a fragmented understanding 
of the attendant risk consequences. Empirical research that comprehensively explores the effects of 
the new market position of the firm on risks is necessary. Such research must address two parallel 
changes associated with servitization. First, manufacturing firms that extend their activities into 
services change their relationships with the external environment. Second, they must integrate 
service processes, values and competences into existing internal organisational arrangements. 
Accordingly, this study builds on the distinction between environmental and internal risks (e.g. 
Miller, 1992) to investigate how these categories affect the impact of service provision on 
companies’ risk profiles. 
Prior research has examined different types of services offered by manufacturing firms, and 
offered service typologies (e.g. Eggert et al., 2011; Eggert et al., 2014; Fang et al., 2008; Johnstone 
et al, 2009). However, the relationship of service types to types of risks has not been explored. In 
order to better design and manage their service offerings, managers need to know how certain 
services might incur greater or lesser risks. 
  The contributions of the present study to management research and practice are threefold. 
First, the study responds to calls for research on the relationship between servitization and 
organisational performance (e.g. Gebauer et al., 2012; Kohtamäki et al., 2013a; Ulaga and Reinartz, 
2011).  It proposes that extended service strategies create new risks for the firm. Such a view has 
yet to be empirically examined, and may further explain why many firms do not attain from 
services the growth and profit gains that they would expect. Second, by disentangling the impact of 
servitization on environmental and internal risks, this research sheds light on the issues that are 
particularly critical when firms move into services. Third, the study confirms the heterogeneity of 
services offered by manufacturers, and provides insights into how they can be classified from a risk 
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perspective.  In doing so, this paper’s findings help managers make more informed decisions 
regarding service strategies and the risks they will need to face according to the service offering 
they will focus on. 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
Given its underlying concern with advancing the understanding of why manufacturing firms that 
enter the service market often fail to achieve rewarding financial performance (i.e., the 
‘servitization paradox’ problem), this study concentrates on servitized firms that have failed in the 
most extreme sense, those that have declared bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy is a clear and objective 
measure of failure.  Moreover, because bankruptcy invites analyses of a firm’s weaknesses and 
risks, a wealth of rich, objective data are often available for bankrupted firms. Accordingly, the 
present investigation of the risks of service-oriented strategies examines particular risks attributed to 
servitized firms around the time of their bankruptcies, and contrasts these risks with risk profiles of 
other similar bankrupted firms that kept pure product-centric orientations. 
The remainder of this section discusses the literature related to the main constructs that 
provide the background to the investigation. First, the service-risk relationship as delineated by 
servitization research is reviewed. Then the discussion turns to the distinctions between 
environmental and internal risks found in the bankruptcy literature. Subsequent sections develop the 
research hypotheses, proposing first that both environmental and internal bankruptcy risks are 
increased under servitization, and second, that risk increases are also influenced by the types of 
services offered. 
 
2.1 Servitization: a risk-based perspective 
The aspect of risk is rarely referenced directly in the servitization literature. Indeed much of the 
literature implicitly assumes that risks reduce as manufacturing firms provide services. Key 
arguments are that, through services, manufacturers enhance the quality of customer relationships 
(Oliva et al., 2012) and develop capability based competitive advantage (Wise and Baumgartner, 
1999). Although extensive scholarly attention has been devoted to the challenges of servitization 
(Gebauer et al., 2012), prior literature has largely neglected the conceptualisation of risk. However, 
some recent studies have raised the possibility that pursuing service related opportunities introduces 
new risks to the service provider. Fang et al. (2008) touch upon the issue when they identify two 
negative mechanisms, organisational conflict and loss of strategic focus, which may affect firm 
value. Similarly, Brady et al. (2005) contend that firms wishing to succeed with services (solutions) 
need enhanced skills in identifying, evaluating and managing long-term risks in supply streams. 
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Various other papers have outlined a shift of risk from the customer to the supplier in the context of 
solution offerings (e.g. Brax and Jonsson, 2009; Davies, 2004; Nordin and Kowalkowski, 2010; 
Storbacka, 2011) or relational services like process outsourcing (e.g. Gebauer, 2008; Oliva and 
Kallenberg, 2003; Raddats and Easingwood, 2010), as these involve the responsibility for suppliers 
to provide specific performance on activities previously carried out in-house by customers. Despite 
an underlying concern with risk, none of these studies particularly emphasises or fully delineates 
the servitization-risk connection. The relevance of risk to the performance of servitization strategies 
is more explicitly addressed by Sawhney et al. (2004), who contend that, while they should be 
encouraged to intensively explore the opportunities for new services, managers should be equally 
advised to assess the pitfalls and risks that these opportunities represent. As for research that more 
thoroughly analyses the risks involved with the extension of a firm’s offering into services, perhaps 
the only work is the study by Nordin et al. (2011). This study is limited by its narrow focus on the 
characteristics of customisation, bundling and range of solution offerings. Moreover, like the 
majority of the extant studies on servitization (Jacob and Ulaga, 2008; Kohtamäki et al., 2013b; 
Raddats and Kowalkowski, 2014), it is based on qualitative evidence from a small number of cases. 
Thus, while prior work has addressed risks in only limited ways, it does suggest that examining 
servitization from a risk perspective may be of value in explain the servitization paradox issue. 
  In sum, an integrated view of the effects of services on risks does not exist, though prior 
work at least hints that risk is an important factor in driving servitization failures. The scant existing 
research in this area is mostly qualitative or theoretical, providing fragmented and inconclusive 
evidence about whether services increase or decrease a firm’s exposure to risks. However, 
considerable documentation can be found on many aspects of servitization, and this can usefully be 
drawn upon to formulate specific research hypotheses. In addition, other streams of literature offer 
various arguments that can be brought to bear in developing further contributions to theory. This 
material provides the foundation for the present investigation that, as previously outlined, is centred 
on an empirical analysis of the impact of servitization on the risks causing manufacturing firms to 
fail. 
 
2.2 Environmental and internal failure risks 
According to organisational theory, firms are exposed to two types of bankruptcy risks: 
environmental and internal (Miller, 1992). Although these two types of risk originally reflected two 
different schools of thought on corporate failure (Mellahi, K. and Wilkinson, 2004), scholars 
currently coalesce around the idea that both environmental and internal forces play a role in 
determining organisational outcomes, including bankruptcies. 
7 
 
The first type of bankruptcy failure risks, environmental risks, refers to changes affecting the 
business landscape of the firm (Sharma and Mahajan, 1980). Because they emanate from outside 
the firm, these risks are beyond the direct control of the firm’s managers (Sheth and Sisodia, 2005). 
Change drivers can be of different natures, including technology, globalisation, regulation, capital 
markets, competition, and demand trends. In addition to such general level constraints, which affect 
all the companies that operate in the same marketplace or industry, environmental risks also include 
firm specific jolts like brand switching by core customers, changing attitudes of stakeholders, or 
unfortunate events. 
 The second type of failure risks, internal risks, refers to mistakes in formulating or executing 
a firm’s strategic market plan as a consequence of decision-making characteristics of top managers 
(Sharma and Mahajan, 1980). Allowing the financial leverage to rise too high, falling behind 
competitors in production technologies, having poor or no inventory control, miscalculating cash 
flows, embarking on unfavourable contracts with customers or business partners might all be fatal 
mistakes. This category also includes internal constraints, like historical liabilities or a lack of 
resources, which do not allow managers to take adequate actions to deal with environmental threats. 
Thus, a firm will fail if its management does not have the ability to deploy an effective business 
strategy, no matter how viable the strategy might be. 
 
2.3 Research hypotheses 
Research on service strategies suggests that services create a counter-cyclical, recession-resistant, 
high-margin revenue stream that reduces cash flow volatility and improves performance (Oliva and 
Kallenberg, 2003; Gebauer et al., 2005). Particularly in economic downturns, servicing an installed 
product base over the lifecycle may compensate for declining product sales, thereby stabilizing cash 
flows. Moreover, existing studies suggest that services are not as susceptible to commoditisation 
and pricing pressures as tangible products; instead, services enable firms to maintain barriers to 
imitation in mature or maturing industries (Gebauer and Friedli, 2005; Mathieu, 2001a). In addition, 
researchers argue that the criticality of service components for the use of some tangible goods, the 
frequently customised nature of service activities, and their influences on switching costs create 
customer loyalty which, in turn, also increases customer cooperation and knowledge sharing (Fang 
et al., 2008; Gebauer et al., 2011). Finally, the positive value experience that services can create via 
customisation, bundling, and better fit of customer needs improves customer satisfaction and 
relationship. These value creating opportunities are central to the Service Dominant Logic (SDL), 
which forcefully argues that service is the fundamental basis for exchange, goods are merely 
distribution mechanism for service, operant resources are fundamental sources of competitive 
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advantage, and customers are always co-creators of value (Vargo and Lusch, 2004). As such, SDL 
places a high priority on understanding the customer experience over time in order to focus on 
benefits created for customers and the value that is exchanged with customers. Accordingly, SDL 
suggests that servitization provides greater intimacy and value co-creation with customers, thereby 
reducing a firm’s exposure to environmental bankruptcy risks, such as those that may be related to 
economic slumps, competition, or customer behaviour.  
The foregoing arguments have played a key role in persuading scholars that manufacturers 
should seek service-led growth. However, it can be argued that they neglect other relationships 
between services and environmental failure risks. First, servitization is a form of business 
diversification; it can thus be examined from the perspective of portfolio theory (PT). On one hand, 
PT argues that diversification is beneficial because, through demand pooling, it buffers the firm 
from market volatility (Markowitz, 1952; Cardozo et al., 1983). Yet, PT also indicates that pooling 
effects occur only when a new business activity (service, product or market) represents a significant 
diversification from existing activities. If there is significant correlation between the demands for 
the various firm activities, and/or if such activities do not share the same productive assets, the 
benefits of pooling are not realised. This is indeed the case of several at-sale services commonly 
offered by manufacturing firms (e.g. product financing, distribution, delivery, retailing). When 
firms offer such services, the portfolio perspective suggests that demand volatility can actually be 
amplified, causing greater uncertainty, asset underutilisation, and exposure to environmental risks. 
Second, researchers emphasise the customer centricity of service markets (e.g. Kindström et 
al., 2013). Because they need to satisfy the unique needs, goals and practices of individual 
customers, services require a market-oriented service development process, which starts with a 
desired outcome for the customer and evolves this outcome into a corresponding service concept 
(Kindström et al., 2013). However, manufacturers often lack formal service development processes 
(Gebauer et al., 2005; Lightfoot and Gebauer, 2011; Martin and Horne, 1992). Services tend to be 
developed according to product-based thinking that prioritizes efficiency, scale economies and 
standardisation, rather than flexibility, variety and customisation (Gebauer et al., 2006; Fang et al., 
2008; Kindström et al., 2013). Service innovation in manufacturing is often driven by technology 
push, while customer preferences are only reflected as perceptions and ideas of front-line personnel 
interacting in the marketplace (Martin and Horne, 1992). Consequently, the available services might 
not appeal to the needs or tastes of the customers, increasing the possibility that a company fails 
because of environmental (market) risks. 
Third, implementing a service strategy leads a manufacturing firm to engage in more 
numerous and more varied operating theatres. This exposes the firm to a wider array of regulatory, 
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legal, economic, and technological issues and associated environmental failure risks. Further, 
providing services entails differences in competition and operations strategy. For example, it reveals 
the presence of unusual competitors, entails significant input from customers (Mathieu, 2001a; Fang 
et al., 2008; Sampson and Froehle, 2006), and often relies on business partners to provide assets, 
skills, market knowledge, and access to customers (Windahl and Lakemond, 2006). Such 
differences introduce additional environmental uncertainties that may compromise performance and 
drive the firm out of business. 
In accordance with the background above (and in contrast with the mainstream literature), it 
is postulated that the negative effects of services on environmental bankruptcy risks are greater than 
the positive ones.  
 
H1: Servitized manufacturing firms (SMFs) are exposed to more environmental failure risks than 
non-servitized manufacturing firms (non-SMFs). 
 
Some scholars have proposed that the Resource-Based View (RBV) provides a useful 
theoretical lens for the study of operations management in the in the context of servitization (e.g. 
Eggert et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2008). The RBV looks inside the firm in order to identify the 
‘VRIN1’ resources on which basis corporate level strategy should be formed and directed (Barney, 
1991). A resource-based perspective emphasises the possibility for a firm to leverage the tangible 
resources (e.g. sales network, call centres, some fixed factors of operations) and intangible 
resources (e.g. technological knowledge, customer relationship, brand reputation) that it accrues in 
the product domain to develop service extensions. At a more strategic level, the RBV claims that 
servitizing involves exploiting connections between products and services to generate new and 
synergistic resource combinations. Doing so should reduce internal inefficiencies, along with 
associated internal bankruptcy risks. 
However, several arguments cast doubt on the prospect of reduced internal risks from 
service infusion. The diversification literature suggests that the benefits from economies of scope in 
a diversified firm are only realised if the costs of internal organisation (i.e. knowhow transfer to the 
new applications, congestions associated with sharing common inputs) are lower than the 
transaction costs of using factor markets (e.g. outside service providers) (Teece, 1980; Williamson, 
1975). Thus, the servitized firm needs to find organisational modes to minimize control loss 
problems that arise from increased sharing of common inputs. Moreover, Fang et al. (2008) 
introduce the concept of service relatedness to indicate the extent to which the service business 
                                                          
1 Valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
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shares common knowledge and resources with the core product business. While certain service 
extensions (e.g. maintenance, product modification and upgrade, integrated solutions) are closely 
related to product knowledge and resources, others (e.g. financial, logistic services) are not. Clearly, 
when firms offer such unrelated services, the benefits from economies of scope will be minimal. 
Further, service activities, especially when unrelated, require the expansion of the firm’s resource 
base, including, in the parlance of SDL, the acquisition or development of operant resources that are 
new to the firm (Kowalkowski, 2010). Therefore, adopting a service transition strategy typically 
entails substantial investments (Eggert et al., 2014), which, if not shared with business partners, 
may increase financial risks (Nordin et al., 2011) and divert resource inputs from the core product 
business (Eggert et al., 2014; Fang et al., 2008; Oliva et al., 2012). Additionally, Transaction Cost 
(TC) theory suggests that increasing levels of diversification also increase the cost of controlling the 
firm’s broader resource base (Conner, 1991).  
Firms therefore need coordination capabilities in order to manage governance and 
information processing needs of greater complexity. Other needs that underpin the transition to 
services concern the adaptation of the relevant organisational elements (e.g. corporate structure, 
culture, human resources, measurement systems) to the presence of the service dimension (Gebauer 
et al., 2010). For example, companies can deliver services through a separate business unit, or they 
can integrate service activities into the corresponding product unit. Existing research seems to 
acknowledge that there is not a generally applicable organisational structure.  Rather, research 
suggests that each firm needs to make the appropriate choice according to the specific service 
strategy that it intends to pursue (Gebauer et al, 2012; Oliva et al., 2012). Similarly, at the cultural 
level, firms must expand their traditional product culture to include a service-related climate and 
culture (Gebauer and Fleisch, 2007). In particular, corporate goals, norms and beliefs need to be 
updated to closely embrace customer-centricity (Mathieu, 2001a; Wise and Baumgartner, 1999). 
All of these increased demands are likely to increase the possibility of managerial mistakes 
in strategy design and implementation of new services, a risk that is compounded by the fact that 
manufacturing managers often lack the background and skills necessary to deal with the increased 
demands that they must face. For example, manufacturing managers may simply be unaware of the 
limitations of their existing competences, organisational structures, and processes in supporting a 
service-based market approach (Eggert et al., 2014). Similarly, managers are confronted with the 
fact that achieving initial results from service initiatives takes longer than with products, so they 
may underestimate the probability that implementing the necessary organisational structure and 
change processes will lead to the expected results (Gebauer and Fleisch, 2007). Moreover, while 
managerial commitment is essential to successful organisational change (Kotter, 1995), 
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manufacturing managers may have difficulty in committing to service initiatives, because they 
divert financial and managerial resources from traditional sources of competitive advantage 
(Gebauer et al., 2005; Gebauer and Fleisch, 2007; Oliva et al., 2012). 
Based on the above arguments, it can be posited that the presence of additional internal risks 
for manufacturing firms that pursue service opportunities. Accordingly: 
 
H2: Servitized manufacturing firms (SMFs) are exposed to more internal failure risks than non-
servitized manufacturing firms (non-SMFs). 
 
Prior research acknowledges that the services offered by manufacturing companies are far 
from homogeneous, indicating that service types may differ substantially in their impacts on firm 
performance (e.g. Eggert et al., 2011; Eggert et al., 2014; Fang et al., 2008; Johnstone et al., 2009). 
The previous discussion suggests that this may be relevant also to risk related performance. A 
review of the servitization and broader service literatures identifies a number of service 
classification schemes. Some of these classifications include all forms of services (e.g. Lovelock, 
1983; Schmenner, 1986), while others are particular to industrial (e.g. Boyt and Harvey, 1997), 
product (e.g. Samli et al., 1992; Frambach et al., 1997) or consumer (Shafti et al., 2007) services, or 
they focus specifically on manufacturers’ offerings (e.g. Mathieu, 2001b; Sawhney et al., 2004), or 
even on specific forms (e.g. industrial services, solutions) of such offerings (Raddats and 
Easingwood, 2010; Windahl and Lakemond, 2010). Although they offer a vast variety of 
dimensions and concepts to characterise emerging service patterns, existing service typologies 
provide very little theoretical guidance regarding the risk implications of different service types. 
The typology proposed by Boyt and Harvey (1997) is one of the rare service classification schemes 
that explicitly incorporate a risk dimension. However, its focus is on the risk associated with 
industrial service failure and its resulting impact on customer operations.  In contrast, the current 
study is concerned with risks for the service provider.  
The issue of risk is also indirectly addressed in the distinction between services supporting 
the product (SSP) and services supporting the customer (SSC) proposed by Mathieu (2001b).  
Whereby SSP tend to ensure proper product access or functioning (e.g. after-sale services), SSC 
help optimise customer processes, actions and strategies associated with the supplied product (e.g. 
financing, training, spare parts management). Compared to SSP, SSC have been associated with 
greater differentiating power (Eggert et al., 2011; Eggert et al., 2014; Mathieu, 2001b), customer 
intimacy, and level of customisation (Raddats and Kowalkowski, 2014), all of which may reduce 
(environmental) bankruptcy risks. Nevertheless, SSC may be more risky, as they are purported to 
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entail greater competition from professional service organisations (Raddats and Easingwood, 2010; 
Salonen, 2011), the need to acquire more service specific capabilities (Kowalkowski et al., 2009; 
Gremyr et al., 2010; Eggert et al., 2014), a more intense organisational change (Kowalkowski et al., 
2009; Gremyr et al., 2010; Eggert et al., 2014), and a shift of responsibility to the supplier for the 
customer processes (Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003; Eggert et al., 2011). However, it must be noted 
that such properties do not apply consistently at the level of individual SSP and SSC. For example, 
becoming responsible for customer processes applies to SSC that entail specific forms of 
outsourcing (e.g. maintenance management), but it does not apply to other SSC services (e.g. 
financing, training, consultancy). Further, Mathieu (2001b)’s distinction is specific to product 
services. In contrast, manufacturers increasingly offer also stand-alone services that are completely 
independent from the product business (Mathieu, 2001a; Raddats and Kowalkowski, 2014). 
Shafti et al. (2007) argue that the extent to which a service classification can be applied 
depends on the purpose to which it was initially developed. And, as discussed above, the academic 
research does not seem to have produced a service typology that appears relevant in a risk 
perspective. Thus, an exploratory approach is taken in offering the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Servitized manufacturing firms (SMFs) offering different types of services are 
exposed to different bankruptcy risks. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample and data collection 
The empirical data for this study came from the 212 bankrupted firms included in the overall 
sample described by Neely (2008). To identify this sample, Neely (2008) analysed a global sample 
of 10846 manufacturing firms listed in the OSIRIS database.  These were all the firms in the 
OSIRIS database with: (i) primary or secondary US SIC codes relating to manufacturing (range 10-
39 inclusive); and (ii) more than 100 employees.  Using the business descriptions included in the 
OSIRIS database to classify firms as either “servitized” or “pure manufacturers”, Neely observed 
that, while only 30.51% (3309) of the firms in the entire sample were servitized, 53.30% of the 
firms that declared bankruptcy were servitized (113 of 212 firms). He concluded that servitized 
firms appear more likely to declare bankruptcy than pure manufacturing firms.
2
 
 Evidence related to the hypotheses was evaluated by means of collecting data about the 
cause(s) for each of the bankruptcies. The data collection took six months to complete (from 
                                                          
2
 Focusing on bankruptcy likelihood as firm performance, this result can be interpreted as evidence of the servitization 
paradox. 
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October 2009 to March 2010) and relied exclusively on secondary sources, thus avoiding potential 
coverage errors (King and He, 2005) and biases associated with self-reported primary data. 
Secondary data are less likely to be influenced by self-report biases, particularly those that inquire 
about past events (Harris, 2001) or about attitudes that may be reconstructed to reflect positively on 
the respondent (Huston, 2004). In addition, because they are usually publicly available, secondary 
data allow for replication and validation studies (Cantalone and Vickery, 2010). 
 Most of the data describing the bankruptcies were collected from the Factiva database 
(Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing), which covers a wide range of business news, including 
newspapers, investment analysis reports and stock quotes.  The use of press as source of data is 
liable to the criticism that news can be biased by editorial policies and journalist judgement.  
However, newspapers have been heavily relied upon as source of data in recent social science 
research.  As observed by Franzosi (1987), no data source is exempt from error and “in the absence 
of systematic and comparative validation, there is no a priori reason to believe that data collected 
from newspapers would be less valid than other commonly used sources.”  At the same time, no 
alternative source of information appeared available for the information sought.  
 The data gathering protocol involved first a search of the Factiva database for all documents 
mentioning the company during a time frame of five days before and one calendar month after the 
date of the bankruptcy filing. Documents were reviewed in order from the oldest to the most recent 
publication date until data saturation occurred (Bowen, 2008), i.e. additional documents added no 
new information about the bankruptcies. This quite often involved progressively expanding the time 
frame and repeating the search, sometimes up to several months after the filing. 
 In order to increase the validity of the data used for the study (Lake et al., 2010), various 
financial news archives, answers databases and company databases were also accessed. Searches 
were run using each firm’s name, combined with the keyword “bankrupt”. The companies’ websites 
were also checked at this stage. Although the websites usually omitted reporting the bankruptcy, 
they nevertheless provided useful information about the histories of the firms.  Further information 
was extracted from narratives in annual reports in and around the year when the bankruptcy 
occurred. 
 As the data were collected, a detailed case study was written to summarize the relevant 
information regarding each firm and the causes of the bankruptcy. 
 
3.2 Data cleaning and validation 
The original sample consisted of 113 servitized manufacturing firms (SMFs) and 99 non-servitized 
manufacturing firms (non-SMFs).  In order to enable comparisons between manufacturing 
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segments, the firms were classified according to their two-digit primary US SIC codes in the 
OSIRIS database. 24 SMFs and 11 non-SMFs, whose primary SIC code did not fall in the 10-39 
(manufacturing) range, were eliminated from the sample. Also excluded was a pure service firm 
that had been mistakenly allocated a manufacturing SIC code.  Information regarding bankruptcy 
causes was not gathered for these firms and the corresponding case studies were left uncompleted.  
As bankruptcy related information was sought for the other firms, 4 SMFs and 14 non-SMFs were 
further excluded due to a lack of information describing their bankruptcies.  Additionally, the data 
collection effort uncovered errors in the automated process used by Neely (2008) to classify firms 
(i.e. search for specific keywords in the “description and history” field of the OSIRIS company 
record). It was determined that 17 SMFs and 12 non-SMFs had not declared bankruptcy. These 
firms were therefore excluded from the sample.  Finally, it was found that 12 firms that the 
automated coding in Neely (2008) had classified as SMFs were actually non-SMFs, while 20 firms 
supposed to be non-SMFs were reclassified as SMFs.  
 In particular, the original classification of the firms as either SMFs or non-SMFs was 
reviewed by manually examining the ‘description of the business’ section of the annual report for 
the year when the bankruptcy occurred. If the report was not available, the ‘description and history 
field’ of the OSIRIS database was used, as this is often extracted from the annual report. The 12 
core types of manufacturers’ services identified by Neely (2008) (listed in Table 4) were used to 
determine servitization status for each firm.  Firms were coded as servitized if their business 
descriptions provided clear evidence that they offered one or more of these service types.  Such an 
approach was grounded on the principle that, though virtually all manufacturers offer at least some 
types of services (see Schmenner (2009) for a historical review), what distinguishes a servitized 
firm from other manufacturing firms is the relevance and strategic use of the services (Oliva and 
Kallenberg, 2003; Gebauer and Friedli, 2005; Gebauer, 2009).  The fact that SMFs called explicit 
reference to service aspects in their business descriptions strongly suggests that the services were 
core to their businesses.  In contrast, while non-SMFs might have offered some levels of service, 
such services were not likely to be strategically important, on the grounds that they were not 
mentioned in annual reports. Appendix A provides illustrative examples of firms classified as SMFs 
and non-SMFs. 
 Given the corrections and exclusions noted above, the final sample for the study consisted of 
75 SMFs and 54 non-SMFs.  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample, demonstrating a 
variety of firm sizes and industries for both SMFs and non-SMFs. Clearly, the sample was broad 
and diverse enough to enable identification of servitization as a major difference between firms, 
whereas such a distinction might not have been as easily made using other research designs. 
15 
 
< Insert table 1 here> 
  One important question about the sample is whether firms chose to servitize because of prior 
financial problems. Some firms could, for example, have seen servitization as a potential solution to 
financial distress, but this would mean that firms choosing to servitize were already prone to 
bankruptcy and hence the servitization would not be an important factor in differentiating between 
the two sets of firms. To explore this potential source of bias, the financial performance of the 
SMFs prior to servitization was compared to their industry averages.  The year of initial 
servitization was determined for each SMF by examining the annual reports in the Capital IQ 
database.  For 34 firms, the Capital IQ database did not provide annual reports old enough to allow 
establishing the initial year of servitization.  However, it could be established that 18 of these firms 
were servitized for at least five years before their bankruptcies and that 14 of the remaining 41 firms 
were servitized at their foundation, suggesting they decided to servitize well before threats of 
bankruptcy emerged.  The initial year of servitization could be determined for the last 27 firms.  
The ROA and ROE of these firms in the year immediately prior to their servitization were 
compared with the average ROA and ROE for all firms in the same three-digit SIC industry 
classification, using data from the Compustat database. Data were not available for three of these 
firms in Compustat.  For the remaining 24 firms, 13 firms had nominally better pre-servitization 
ROE than their industry peers, and 11 firms had nominally better ROA.  Statistical tests comparing 
these 24 SMFs with their industry averages showed no significant differences for either mean or 
median values of ROA or ROE in the year prior to servitization.  Collectively, these results suggest 
that poor prior performance was not a consistent reason why SMFs initially servitized. 
 
3.3 Research instrument development 
A framework of the causes of bankruptcy proposed by Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) was used to 
develop a coding instrument (codebook) for examining the risks that led each of the sample firms to 
fail. The Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) framework was particularly useful, for several reasons.  First, 
the framework has been previously applied in empirical studies (Novak and Sajter, 2007; Ooghe 
and De Prijcker, 2008).  Second, unlike other models for analysing failure, the Ooghe and Waeyaert 
(2004) framework specifically regards the causes of bankruptcy.  Third, it proposes a wider range of 
potential failure causes than other frameworks.  Finally, it allows investigation of bankruptcy at a 
level of analysis consistent with the data collected in this study, specifically, qualitative data 
regarding the firms and their bankruptcies.  
 In line with other studies of corporate collapse (e.g. Sharma and Mahajan, 1980; Mellahi and 
Wilkinson, 2004; Sheth and Sisodia, 2005), the Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) framework structures 
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the potential causes of business failure under the headings of environmental and internal risks. 
Specifically, the framework identifies two categories of environmental risks: (i) general 
environment and (ii) immediate environment (see Table 2). The general environment category 
includes factors that are common to all the firms in a given industry: economics, technology, 
foreign countries, politics and social factors. In contrast, the immediate environment comprises 
factors that are specific to the business context of the individual firm: customers, suppliers, 
competitors, banks and credit institutions, stockholders and misadventure. 
 Internal failure risks are outlined in the Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) framework as belonging 
to three categories: (i) management abilities, (ii) corporate policy, and (iii) company characteristics. 
Management abilities include: motivations, qualities, skills and personal characteristics. The 
corporate policy category refers to strategy and investments, commercial, operational, finance and 
administration, and corporate governance. Finally, the company characteristics category includes 
the company’s maturity, size, industry and flexibility. 
 In order to assign risk types to each of the company bankruptcies, the case studies prepared 
for the first 50 SMFs in the list identified by Neely (2008) were initially examined.  Typically the 
case studies identified a combination of factors underlying each firm’s bankruptcy. In the first 
round of analysis, the specific factors were identified and then these were grouped into generic 
factors describing the causes of bankruptcy. Formal definitions for each of these generic factors 
were produced and combined to create a codebook used for subsequent coding. A shortcoming of 
the original Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) framework is that it does not provide an explicit list of the 
factors within each of the main categories it discusses. Hence the empirical data were used to enrich 
the original Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) framework. During this process, the definitions of the 
individual factors causing bankruptcy were repeatedly revised to avoid ambiguity and overlap. 
 Not all of the risk factors included in the original Ooghe and Waeyaert framework were 
present in the company case histories.  However, each and every one of the risk factors identified in 
the case histories did correspond to one of the factors identified in the framework; i.e., no new risk 
factors were uncovered.  Both these results suggest that the original framework was sufficiently 
comprehensive. 
 Notably, the data sources did not provide information regarding "management abilities" 
category in the original framework.  While this is a limitation of the study, the coding method does 
at least assess management abilities indirectly, through their impacts on mistakes in corporate 
policy (Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008).  Management abilities are the main antecedents of decisions 
regarding corporate policy, and the actual causes of bankruptcy are these decisions. Therefore, 
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though the codebook neglects management abilities, it captures corporate policy risk factors, 
consistent with a focus on the immediate causes of bankruptcy. 
 Once the codebook had been developed, the remaining case studies in the sample were 
examined. This second phase resulted in slight refinements to the codebook, as a few new factors 
emerged and a few discrepancies with previously identified factors originated. However, no 
significant modifications to the codebook were introduced after the first 80 firms in the sample were 
analyzed; this suggests that theoretical saturation had been reached, i.e. analyzing additional firms 
would not have led to further changes to the codebook (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Appendix B 
provides a copy of the final codebook used; it defines 35 factors that can result in bankruptcy. 
 
3.4 Data analysis 
The data analysis procedure followed the content analysis technique formulated by Berelson (1952). 
This technique uses pre-established procedures and rules of coding to systematically classify 
textual/qualitative material according to purposively selected content categories. The content 
analytic approach is argued as a scientific approach for extracting both manifest and latent 
communication contents, describing specific phenomena and making inferences about constructs of 
interest (Weber, 1990). It also allows qualitative data to be converted into a quantitative form, so 
that appropriate statistical analyses can be performed to enhance the validity of findings. Content 
analysis is a well regarded methodology in social science research and its use in this study is 
supported by recent operations and supply chain management literature - see, for example, 
Montabon et al. (2007); Tate et al. (2010); Tangpong (2011); Hofer et al. (2012). 
 The approach used was modelled on Montabon et al. (2007) and closely followed guidelines 
in Tangpong (2011). The 35 factors in the contained in the codebook served as content categories to 
frame the coding of data. The recoding unit was identified as the “idea(s)” (Tangpong, 2011) 
regarding the causes of bankruptcy found in the case study documents developed for the firms. The 
use of a large recording unit was based on ensuring semantic validity of the coding (Tangpong, 
2011), given that the same factor could have been worded in many different ways in the documents. 
Extended descriptions of the framework factors were developed in order to provide the coders with 
specific instructions for recognising these factors in the text (Appendix B). 
 The content analysis was performed by two independent coders and was executed over a 
period of three weeks. A member of the research team served as the first coder, thus assuring that 
the coder was familiar with the coding process (Milner and Adler, 1999). In order to validate coding 
reliability, an independent experienced researcher was recruited as the second coder. Following the 
example of Hofer et al. (2012), to minimize bias, the research objectives were not discussed in the 
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training session given to the second coder. Both coders examined all the firms in the sample and 
completed a coding sheet for each firm according to the definitions provided for the coding factors 
(Appendix B). The second coder was asked to re-examine the first few firms a second time, after he 
analysed all the 129 sample firms.  
 The coding results showed a percentage of agreement of 96.21% between the two coders. 
Importantly, reliabilities for the two coders exceeded recommended minimums.  Overall reliability 
across the two initial sets of codes was 0.775, as measured by Krippendorff’s alpha (Krippendorff, 
2004a).  Calculated separately for the data sets of SMFs and non-SMFs (Krippendorff, 2004b), 
reliability was 0.774 and 0.777, respectively. Among categories of risks, the lowest reliability was 
obtained for the corporate policy category (0.734), still well within the levels typically considered 
appropriate (Krippendorff, 2004b). In addition, the second coder reported no substantive problems 
in capturing the reported causes of failure through the framework. Based on these results, the 
information provided by the content analysis was deemed to be a valid measure of the constructs of 
interest (Tangpong, 2011). 
 After the coding was completed, the few discrepancies that remained were discussed until 
the two coders reached agreement.  Appendix C shows how the framework factors were applied to 
the coding of the example firms in Appendix A. 
 Group and paired t-tests were used to analyse the research hypotheses. Sample matching and 
ANCOVA were also performed to ensure that the results were not due to differences between SMFs 
and non-SMFs other than their differences in servitization. Finally, cluster analysis was employed 
to classify SMFs’ service offerings for the exploration of H3. 
 
4. Results 
Table 2 illustrates the impacts of the risk factors in the coding framework, showing the frequency of 
each factor’s occurrence in contributing to bankruptcies of the SMFs and non-SMFs in the study 
sample.  For both SMFs and non-SMFs, the most common environmental causes of failure were 
economic downturn and industry recession - followed by competition from foreign countries, 
increased price of raw materials and energy, failure of core customers (especially for SMFs).  
Environmental risks were concentrated on these five factors.  Internal operating risks were more 
widely spread. Except for cost of expansion through acquisitions for SMFs, none of the risk factors 
significantly outweighed others.  SMFs were affected on average by 3.65 risk factors, while non-
SMFs were affected on average by 2.87 risk factors.  A group t-test indicated that this difference in 
mean numbers of risks is statistically significant at p=0.001. 
< Insert tables 2 and 3 here> 
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  For conceptual clarity, it is should be stressed that this result does not demonstrate that 
servitization (or lack thereof) caused bankruptcy.  Instead, it shows that bankrupted firms who had 
servitized were exposed to more risks than bankrupted firms who had not servitized. It is worth re-
iterating that this study does not compare bankrupted firms against non-bankrupted firms.  Instead, 
it makes use of risk profiles available in data generated for bankrupt firms. 
  Hypotheses H1 and H2 posit that SMFs are more exposed to environmental and internal 
bankruptcy risk factors, respectively. The results of group t-tests presented in Table 3 provides no 
support for H1.  However, the results provide strong support for H2; SMFs appear to be more 
exposed to internal risks than non-SMFs are (p<0.0005). In order to explore these effects further, 
similar t-test comparisons were conducted for the four risk sub-categories identified in the proposed 
risk categorization framework. The results in Panel B of Table 3 confirm that risk counts in the 
general and immediate environmental risks sub-categories do not differ across SMFs and non-
SMFs. The results further indicate that both sub-categories of internal risks differ significantly 
across the two types of firms; the statistical significance of these differences are p=0.03 and 
p<0.0005, respectively.  
  There were no indications of differences in industry membership or firm size across the sub-
samples of SMFs and non-SMFs.  However, to control for the possibility that differences in risk 
factors between SMFs and non-SMFs are artefacts of other factors such as the nature of the 
products offered, size of the firm, and timeframe of the bankruptcy, risk differences were evaluated 
among matched pairs of SMFs and non-SMFs.  Firms were paired on the following criteria:  they 
were within a ratio of +/- 20 in number of employees, they had gone bankrupt within the same two-
year period, they were headquartered in the same country, and they were members of the same two-
digit SIC industry classification.  Using these criteria, 27 matched pairs were constructed.  
Tightening the criteria further produced a substantial reduction in sample size.   
  Panel C of Table 3 repeats the analyses using the 27 industry-size-year matched pair firms 
identified above.  The results confirm support for H2 and lack of support for H1. 
  Finally, the possibility was considered that firm age might also confound the results, as 
SMFs were on average significantly younger (33.4 years old) at the time of bankruptcy than non-
SMFs (51.9 years old).  To control for this possibility, an ANCOVA was executed with the total 
number of risks as dependent variable, and including both firm size (employees) and age at 
bankruptcy as covariates.  The ANCOVA results confirmed that SMFs had significantly more 
internal risk factors than non-SMFs, with no significant differences in external risk factors, while 
controlling for age and size factors.   
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  Hypothesis H3 posits that different service types are associated with different risks leading 
to bankruptcy.  As previously contended, the literature does not provide a categorisation of service 
offerings (and ultimately services) that appears appropriate to this study. Consequently, cluster 
analysis was used to establish servitization types.  Cluster analysis is an inductive method of 
classification, centred on grouping items (here firms) based on some measurement of proximity 
among such items (Saunders, 1994). The cluster analysis was performed using the two-stage 
procedure in SPSSV.18, with service type codings as criteria. The procedure with default settings 
automatically selects the optimum number of clusters according to the specified distance measure 
(log-likelihood) and assigns observations to clusters using a clustering criterion (Schwarz’s 
Bayesian Criterion).  The analysis yielded two servitization groups; one group containing 38 firms, 
the other containing 37 firms. Repeated analyses using different distance and clustering criteria 
yielded identical results. In addition, the analyses were repeated five times with random hold-out 
samples of 10%. The results from all five runs were nearly identical. In only one run, two 
observations were assigned to a different cluster.  These results indicate that the cluster solution is 
robust to both clustering method and sampling issues. Appendix D shows examples of firms in each 
of the two servitization groups. 
  Table 4 shows the number of firms in each group that offers each service type.  Chi-square 
tests indicate that firms in group one, which were named “Demand Chain Services” were 
significantly more likely to offer both retail and distribution services, as well as financial services.  
Firms in group 2, which were named “Product Support Services” were significantly more likely to 
offer more product-centric services including systems and solutions, installation and 
implementation, and maintenance and support services. 
< Insert table 4 here> 
  In order to investigate evidence in support of H3, ANOVA was conducted for numbers of 
risk types, with post hoc comparisons across three groups: demand chain SMFs, product support 
SMFs and non-SMFs.  Table 5 provides the results of comparisons for total bankruptcy risks, and 
for the risk sub-classes identified earlier. The results again indicate that firms in both of the SMFs 
groups incur more total risks than firms in the non-SMFs group do.  However, the total number of 
risks does not differ significantly across the two servitization strategy groups. 
< Insert table 5 here> 
  As Table 5 shows, a significant difference between numbers of environmental bankruptcy 
risks for demand chain and product support SMFs provides support for H3 (p<0.05). Further, the 
results indicate that the demand chain SMFs encountered more general environment bankruptcy 
risks than product support SMFs did, though this difference is only marginally significant (p=0.07). 
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Interestingly, the results also indicate that demand chain SMFs encountered more total 
environmental bankruptcy risks than non-SMFs did, thus amending the findings pertaining to H1. 
Again, this difference is marginally significant (p=0.06); thus, conclusions associated with these 
findings must be regarded as tentative. 
  Results in the lower half of Table 5 confirm that firms in both servitization strategy groups 
encounter more internal bankruptcy risks than non-SMFs firms do.  Significant differences exist for 
both corporate policy risks and for corporate characteristics risks.  However, the number of internal 
risks does not differ across the two servitization strategy groups; thus H3 is not supported at this 
level of analysis. 
  In summary, the results indicate that SMFs do incur significantly more bankruptcy risk types 
than non-SMFs; the key difference is in numbers of internal risks.  However, demand chain SMFs 
also have more total environmental risks than non-SMFs do. And they appear to encounter more 
general environmental risks than product support SMFs do. 
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Theoretical contribution 
This study sought to assess the relationship between a manufacturing firm’s servitization and its 
exposure to bankruptcy risks, and in particular the influence on this relationship of the type of 
services offered by the firm. The findings show that the presence of a service business increases 
bankruptcy risks for the supplying firm. The overall findings evidence no significant impact on 
environmental bankruptcy risks, but significantly higher internal bankruptcy risks. However, when 
differentiating firms according to the types of services they offer, the findings highlight that 
servitized manufacturing firms (SMFs) offering demand chain services (i.e. retail and distribution, 
financial services) are also exposed to greater environmental risks. In contrast, the findings identify 
that SMFs offering product support services (i.e. systems and solutions, installation and 
implementation, maintenance and support) encounter significantly less general environmental risks 
than demand chain SMFs, although still not less environmental risks than non-SMFs. 
These results make several contributions to servitization research, general management and 
bankruptcy literatures. They provide empirical evidence of the impact of servitization on 
organisational (bankruptcy) risk. Prior studies have contended that the introduction of services may 
modify the risks faced by a manufacturing firm, but have not provided detailed insight into the 
servitization-risk relationship. This study responds to calls for more detailed insights (Fang et al., 
2008; Nordin et al., 2011) and for empirical evidence from quantitative studies on services (Jacob 
and Ulaga, 2008; Gebauer et al., 2012). In addition, the study extends the conversation on the 
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servitization paradox, as increased risks may partially explain why manufacturing firms can fail to 
achieve the performance they expect through service provision. 
This study distinguishes between environmental and internal bankruptcy risks. By 
suggesting that services enable manufacturing firms to secure their market position and achieve 
customer-centric value, the mainstream servitization literature and SDL generate the expectation of 
lower environmental risks under servitization. The findings of this research challenge such an 
expectation, indicating that service offerings do not reduce environmental bankruptcy risks. As 
noted, this may result from a more complex interaction between the firm and the business 
environment. The offering of services may expose the firm to greater demand volatility, to different 
customer needs, to the uncertainties of a wider range of operating theatres and, thus, also to greater 
environmental bankruptcy risks. The data examined in this study do not show that environmental 
bankruptcy risks increase or decrease, the findings instead suggest that the positive and negative 
effects of services on these risks may cancel each other out. 
This study does find that the presence of a service business increases a firm’s internal 
bankruptcy risks. This is consistent with transaction cost theory, as service diversification is likely 
to increase the cost of internal organisation and control, with economies of scope arguments 
underscoring that some service extensions involve operant resources that are new to the firm, and 
with the notion that successful service deployment requires structural changes in the arrangement of 
organisational design factors. Most importantly, dealing with these internal challenges requires 
managerial attitudes and approaches that may not be straightforward for a company with an 
historical focus on goods. The findings of the present research complement the existing servitization 
literature by suggesting that few firms are able to easily and quickly cope with the internal 
challenges of deploying a service strategy, and few managers are competent in controlling the 
attendant risk consequences. 
This study responds to calls from scholars for studies that adopt a more fine-grained view of 
services when researching their impact on manufacturing firms’ performance (Eggert et al., 2011; 
Eggert et al., 2014; Fang et al., 2008). The study finds that demand chain services and product 
support services present significant differences with respect to the servitization-risks connection, 
thereby providing evidence on the heterogeneity of manufacturers’ service offerings. The evidence 
of greater impact of environmental risks on demand chain SMFs provides empirical support for 
portfolio theory which, as noted in the formulation of H1, indicates that risk pooling effects are not 
realised if the various firm’s activities exhibit highly correlated demands and do not share the same 
productive assets. Indeed, because demand chain services are only sold with new product units, 
their demand is highly correlated with volatility in the product market. By contrast, revenues from 
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product support services (and maintenance contracts in particular) are often counter-cyclical to 
product sales and therefore more resistant to economic cycles that drive capital investment (Neely, 
2008; Eggert et al., 2014). Demand chain services tend also to be unrelated to the firm’s existing 
resource base. Their resource requirements, essentially assets such as distribution facilities or stores, 
are highly service specific, while product support services have better chances to exploit 
manufacturing core resources. Therefore, the results suggest that pooling effects may be a key 
mechanism to contrast the increase of environmental failure risks for firms that diversify into 
services. This in turn indicates that the perspective of diversification research can be directly 
relevant to the examination of manufacturers’ service strategies, supporting the call of Gebauer et 
al. (2012) for a greater use of general management theories in servitization research.  
 The results also prompt a more speculative comment regarding the use of the RBV 
perspective to study the practicalities of service transition. It was noted (H2) that the RBV 
perspective would suggest lower internal risks for product support services because of greater 
synergies with the product business (Fang et al., 2008), whereas no significant differences were 
found between types of service offerings at the level of internal bankruptcy risks. The RBV 
emphasis is on how firms can leverage existing resources and capabilities to provide services. 
Product support services enable greater spillovers. However, especially when they are aimed at 
supporting complex technical assets over the lifecycle, product support services also require the 
implementation and management of a broad set of service-related resources and capabilities. In 
contrast, demand chain services tend to be focused on few types of assets and competences. 
According to the findings of the present study, this characteristic of demand chain services may 
counterbalance the reduced opportunities of spillovers by downsizing the overall internal 
organisational challenge. Therefore, it can be contended that the RBV should not be applied in 
isolation to examining the risks of services; the amount of resources and capabilities that are 
involved with service provision is also a central issue to uncover the differential risk effects of 
service types. 
 
Managerial contribution 
To defend their market position and grow their profits, many manufacturing firms are upgrading 
their offerings with services. However, the results of this study suggest that service extensions lead 
to increased bankruptcy risks for the firm, highlighting the importance for managers to be aware 
that the risks of service strategies may outweigh the benefits. While they indicate that 
manufacturing managers cannot just adhere to calls to adopt SDL, these results should not be 
interpreted as a suggestion to avoid service strategies. According to such results, internal risks are 
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more salient. Hence, management abilities appear to have significant potential for controlling the 
risk consequences of service transitions. 
 This study highlights that the type of service offering has an influence on the relationship 
between services and bankruptcy risks. Because they require limited technical knowhow, demand 
chain services are attractive for manufacturing firms in search of new revenue opportunities. 
However, building on the results of this study, managers should consider that such services amplify 
uncertainties and risks associated with the product business. 
 
Limitations and future research directions 
  The limitations of this study provide other opportunities for future research.  First, the 
investigation focused on data associated with bankruptcy filings.  Bankruptcy is the most extreme 
form of organizational failure; it therefore invites thorough analysis by business writers and 
analysts, thereby providing a source of rich secondary data.  Future research would do well to study 
a much broader set of low performing SMFs, though obtaining data comparable to the data used in 
this study may prove to be quite difficult.  Second, the bankruptcy risk factors examined in this 
study reflect variables identified in previous studies of corporate performance outcomes. However, 
studies of related factors, especially those relating to the strengths and weaknesses of internal 
managers, would be useful.  Third, this study controlled for contextual factors including firm age, 
size, location, and industry. However, other factors such as product business diversification, market 
position, existing capabilities, and readiness to change of the firm might be important moderators of 
the servitization-risk relationship.  Fourth, the data used in this study do not enable a thorough 
investigation of whether it is the transition process or the nature of the service offering that causes 
servitized firms to be exposed to more bankruptcy risks.  Although it is likely that both aspects have 
a role and that their relative importance depends on the type of services, studies that explicitly and 
fully address such question would be valuable.  Finally, although the conclusions of this study fall 
short of providing a complete resolution of the servitization paradox, they are suggestive of some of 
the particular challenges to servitization that tend to offset the strategy’s purported benefits.  Such 
conclusions are based on bankruptcy data and the analysis of a number of risk factors associated 
with bankruptcy exposure. In order to advance research further, there is real need of a more 
comprehensive definition, measurement and comparison of the risks that a manufacturer incurs 
when it chooses to move away from its traditional manufacturing focus. 
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Appendix A – Examples of firms’ classifications 
Non-SMFs 
Firm Business description Source 
Delta Woodside 
Industries, Inc. 
“The Company produces woven textile fabrics through its Delta Mills 
operation. Delta Mills is the only business segment of the Company. The 
Company currently manufactures woven textile fabrics from cotton yarn, 
wool, flax or synthetic fibers or from synthetic filament yarns... The 
Company believes that it is a leading producer of cotton pants- weight 
woven fabric used in the manufacture of casual slacks such as Levi 
Strauss' Dockers(R) and Haggar Corp.'s Wrinkle- free(R). Other apparel 
items manufactured with the Company's fabrics include women's chino 
pants, and career apparel (uniforms). The Company also sells camouflage 
fabric and other fabrics to apparel manufacturers for their use in 
manufacturing apparel for the United States Department of Defense.” 
2005 Annual Report 
SMFs 
Firm Business description Source Services offered 
Daw Technologies, 
Inc. 
“Daw Technologies, Inc. is a global supplier of ultra- clean 
manufacturing environments, or cleanrooms, primarily to 
microelectronics manufacturers, but also to customers in the 
pharmaceutical, biotechnology and food processing industries... In 
addition to selling cleanroom design and installation services, and 
cleanroom component products, on a stand alone basis, the Company is 
one of only a handful of companies worldwide that offers a fully 
integrated, or turnkey, approach to cleanroom design and installation... In 
contrast to the traditional approach, the Company believes that its 
integrated cleanroom approach can provide customers with greater 
flexibility and project control by reducing the number of vendors, 
subcontractors and suppliers and simplifying coordination of the project... 
Specifically, the Company provides, either separately or as part of an 
integrated package, architectural engineering and design, manufacturing, 
installation, construction, project management, testing, certification, tool 
fit- up, and continuing on- site service and support for cleanrooms. The 
Company also designs, engineers, manufactures, and services certain 
principal component systems for advanced cleanrooms. The Company 
also designs, engineers and manufactures environmentally controlled 
mini- environments, primarily for use in the microelectronics, 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries...” 
2002 Annual Report Design and 
Development 
services 
Installation and 
Implementation 
services 
Maintenance and 
Support services 
 
Appendix B. Definitions of the risk codebook factors 
 
GENERAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Economics 
1. General economic downturn: Extended decline in general economic activity affecting the regional, national or global economy. 
2. Recession in the industry: Depressed market conditions in the firm’s industry. Typically demand shortfall causing profit margins in 
the sector to be strongly reduced. Could also refer to negative cycles affecting the customers’ industries. 
3. Industry overcapacity: Excess production capacity in the firm’s industry. Typically due to saturation of the market, increased 
capacity of the firms in the industry, or intense competition from new companies entering the market. 
4. Increased price of raw materials and energy: escalation in material and/or energy costs. 
5. Changes in currency exchange rates: currency depreciation or appreciation. These use to respectively inflate foreign debt and hit 
sales. 
 
Technology 
6. Technological advance: Introduction of new product or service technology. Transition of the industry sector to next-generation 
technologies. 
 
Foreign countries 
7. Competition from foreign countries: Entry onto the market of foreign producers. Increase in competition from foreign producers, 
typically price-based competition from cheap imports. 
8. Problems with projects abroad: Increase in labour and other production costs in foreign countries. Political changes in foreign 
countries. Typically affecting production activities at foreign plants. 
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Politics 
9. Impact of regulations: Regulatory obstacles. These might include, for example, labour agreements not allowing to shed employees, 
regulations affecting product or service markets, as well as limitations imposed to the use of products or services by customers. 
 
Social factors 
10. Compensation payments following litigations: Liabilities for damages to people. Environmental liabilities. 
 
IMMEDIATE ENVIRONMENT 
 
Customers 
11. Failure or decreased spending of key customers: Bankruptcy of major customers causing these to shut down activities. Troubles 
facing major customers and weakening demand for the company’s products or services. For companies having mainly 
governmental customers, this could also include cut of public spending. 
12. Switching of key customers to competitors: Expiring of key contracts without chances of renewal. Loss of orders from key 
customers. 
13. Shift in customer taste: Changes in customer demand patterns resulting in decreasing market for the company’s products or 
services. Also failure to adapt products or services to shifts in market demand. 
14. Lack of customer interest for new products or services: Inability to make new products/services pay because of less than expected 
customer interest. 
15. Loss of reputation: Any cause of damage to the public image of the company. Emergence of issues like poor product quality, 
delivery inefficiencies, frauds, etc. Also lawsuits and allegations. Typically leading to sale losses. 
 
Banks and credit institutions 
16. Tightening of lending conditions: Company’s lenders imposing harsher financial burdens and/or restrictions to additional 
borrowing. 
17. Exceptional and unforeseeable events: Natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes, floods, fires) that hit company’s facilities or its markets. 
 
CORPORATE POLICY 
 
Strategy and investment 
18. Inability to restructure: Failure to restructure operations. Typically in conjunction with the need to upgrade equipment, modernise 
operations and/or move production abroad in order to reduce production costs. Could also be related to the need of downsizing 
operations. Inability includes inability to attract the necessary capital, managerial inertia to change, as well as problems in 
implementing the restructuring plan. 
19. Excessive time to market for new products or services: New products or services not being available on the market when planned. 
20. High cost of introducing new products or services: Investment of substantial resources in new products/services or in renewing 
existing ones. Especially R&D costs but also marketing, advertising and other expenses. This could also include the cost of 
developing/acquiring the technical capability to offer new services. 
21. Excessive restructuring charges: Investments to improve the cost structure of the company (e.g. technology upgrades). Cost of 
resizing operations, to either expand or scale down production. 
22. Cost of expansion through acquisitions: Investments in acquisitions, made to grow and/or diversify the company. This could 
include the expansion of manufacturing or service production capacity, the broadening of product or service lines, the extension 
of geographical reach. 
23. Changes of ownership: Cost incurred when spinning off from other companies or going public. Also liabilities taken over when 
spinning off from or merging with other companies. 
 
Commercial policy 
24. Lack of proper merchandising for products or services: Marketing mistakes, like poor or expensive advertising strategy, 
ineffective communication with the customers, wrong channels to market. 
25. Unfavourable contracts with customers: Contracts that accrued larger expenses than the company had planned. Penalties due to 
late completion of projects. 
 
Operational policy 
26. Operational inefficiencies: Inability to run operations in an efficient manner. High cost of operations compared to competitors.  
27. Excess inventory: Poor inventory management practices resulting in the product being overstocked along the supply chain. 
28. Failure in integrating acquisitions: Inefficiencies/costs resulting from the attempted integration of newly acquired facilities with 
existing ones. 
29. Problems with business partners: Termination of agreements with business partners. Unprofitable agreements with business 
partners. Legal disputes with business partners. 
 
Personnel 
30. Non competitive wage and benefit levels: High salaries and bonuses paid to managers and workforce. 
 
Finance and administration 
31. Accounting errors: Improper recording of financial data, resulting in the revision of previously issued financial statements. Also 
possibly accompanied by shareholder lawsuits. 
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32. Speculation and illegal actions by executives: Malpractices and frauds committed by the company’s executives. Also failure to 
recognise and avoid frauds. 
 
COMPANY’S CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Size 
33. Insufficient resources and reputation to keep up with competitors: Inability to face the competition from larger rivals that might 
have operated longer, have better name recognition, more established business relationships, and greater financial, marketing, 
technical and other resources than the company. 
 
Industry 
34. Labour legacy liabilities: High personnel costs. Also cost of providing pensions, healthcare, and other benefits to retired workers. 
  
Flexibility 
35. Inability to reduce costs when production decreases: Operations becoming inefficient when the company scaled down 
production. Typically related to the inability to shut off overheads. 
 
Appendix C. Examples of coding 
Non-SMFs 
Firm Text in case study document Relevant bankruptcy causes* 
Delta Woodside 
Industries, Inc. 
The company’s financial troubles were primarily due to the unanticipated 
success of foreign imports, primarily from China, and the high level of 
overcapacity in the domestic textile industry. Like many US textile 
manufacturers, Delta was forced to make aggressive cost cuts and close 
down numerous textile plants. It had to engage into a comprehensive 
reorganization strategy that resulted in high restructuring expenditures. 
The company suffered its final blow when the US Defence Department 
reduced its orders from apparel manufacturers that used Delta’s fabrics, 
since this segment was a primary source for the entire Delta’s profit 
margin. 
Also contributing to the failure were continued high energy costs which 
increased production costs as well as increased costs of yarn and greige 
fabric. 
3.   Industry overcapacity 
4.   Increased price of raw materials and 
energy 
7.   Competition from foreign countries 
11. Failure or decreasing spending of key 
customers 
21. Excessive restructuring charges 
 
* after agreement between coders 
SMFs 
Firm Text in case study document Relevant bankruptcy causes* 
Daw Technologies, 
Inc. 
Daw blamed its misfortune on the dramatic downturn that affected the 
semiconductor industry since 2000, as well as the general economic 
slowdown. The company had largely expanded during the ‘90s and built 
some of the biggest fabrication labs in the world. These huge 
manufacturing facilities became a liability when the semiconductor 
industry went into downturn. In fact, the company did not manage to shut 
overheads of its manufacturing operations off enough when demand 
decreased. Daw decided to change its business model and rely on other 
firms to handle its manufacturing. It also sold its mini-environments 
segments in order to concentrate on more profitable segments. This was 
not enough. 
In addition, a few contracts in Europe accrued larger expenses than the 
company initially targeted. The company also underwent financial woes 
because accounting errors with its European operations missed about $10 
million in losses from these contracts – in April 2002 Daw was forced to 
make financial restatements. 
Finally, the company suffered from internal inefficiencies, primarily 
related to high salaries paid to middle managers. 
1.   General economic downturn 
2.   Recession in the industry 
22. Cost of expansion through acquisitions 
25. Unfavourable contracts with customers 
30. Non competitive wage and benefit levels 
31. Accounting errors 
35. Inability to reduce costs when production 
decreases 
 
* after agreement between coders 
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Appendix D – Examples of servitization groups 
Demand chain SMFs 
Firm Business description Source Services offered 
Oakwood Homes 
Corp. 
“Oakwood Homes Corporation… designs, manufactures, markets 
and distributes manufactured and modular homes and finances the 
majority of its retail sales. Prior to November 1, 2002, the Company 
also provided a variety of insurance products to its customers and 
assumed a portion of the related underwriting risk through its captive 
reinsurance business... At September 30, 2002, the Company's 
manufactured homes were sold at retail through 224 Company 
owned and operated sales centers located primarily in the 
southeastern and southwestern United States and to approximately 
600 independent retailers located throughout the United States.” 
2002 Annual Report Retail and distribution 
services 
Financial services 
Product support SMFs 
Firm Business description Source Services offered 
Silicon Graphics “SGI is a leading provider of products and services for use in 
high- performance computing and data management. We sell 
solutions based on a complete range of scalable servers and 
storage products… Our service portfolio offers system solution 
engineering services, professional and managed services, and 
traditional customer support and education. SGI Professional 
Services is a total solution provider…We design solutions to help 
our customers achieve their technology and business goals and 
overcome their greatest challenges…. SGI Managed Services 
include… hardware installation, system deployment, 
implementation, and on- site and remote system management. 
SGI Support Services… include hardware and software 
support....” 
2006 Annual Report Systems and 
solutions 
Installation and 
Implementation 
services 
Maintenance and 
Support services 
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Table 1 – Description of the sample 
Industry sector 
(SIC code) 
Description # non-SMFs % # SMFs % 
10 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
20 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
 
37 
38 
 
39 
Metal mining 
Oil and gas extraction 
Mining and quarrying of non-metallic minerals, except fuels 
Building construction, general contractors and operative builders 
Heavy construction, other than building construction contractors 
Construction, special trade constructors 
Food and kindred products 
Textile mill products 
Apparel and other finished products made from fabric and similar material 
Lumber and wood products, except furniture 
Furniture and fixtures 
Paper and allied products 
Printing, publishing and allied industries 
Chemicals and allied products 
Petroleum refining and related industries 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products 
Leather and leather products 
Stone, clay, glass and concrete products 
Primary metal industries 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment 
Industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment 
Electronic and other electrical equipment and components, except computer 
equipment 
Transportation equipment 
Measuring, analysing and controlling instruments; photographic, medical 
and optical goods; watches and clocks 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 
1 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
1 
6 
2 
0 
1 
1 
2 
4 
2 
5 
0 
0 
8 
2 
3 
5 
 
6 
1 
 
1 
2% 
0% 
2% 
4% 
0% 
0% 
2% 
11% 
4% 
0% 
2% 
2% 
4% 
7% 
4% 
9% 
0% 
0% 
15% 
4% 
6% 
9% 
 
11% 
2% 
 
2% 
0 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
3 
3 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
1 
1 
2 
6 
4 
13 
15 
 
4 
4 
 
3 
0% 
1% 
1% 
1% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
5% 
4% 
4% 
0% 
1% 
0% 
3% 
0% 
1% 
1% 
3% 
8% 
5% 
17% 
20% 
 
5% 
5% 
 
4% 
Total 54 100% 75 100% 
   # firms Mean Std. Dev. 
  Firm size (#employees) 
Non-SMFs 
SMFs 
54 
75 
2329.67 
6544.97 
4008.70 
22142.63 
  Profit margin* (%) 
Non-SMFs 
SMFs 
44 
66 
-23.27 
-11.58 
98.39 
29.59 
  Stock turnover* (times/year) 
Non-SMFs 
SMFs 
44 
64 
8.62 
13.21 
6.73 
23.84 
  * based on 1999 data     
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Table 2 – Impact of the framework factors by firm category 
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Table 3 – Comparison of environmental and internal risks for non-SMFs and SMFs 
Panel A  N Mean Std. Deviation t p 
Environmental risks (H1) non-SMFs 
SMFs 
54 1.70 1.18 0.85 0.198 
75 1.88 1.15   
Internal risks (H2) non-SMFs 54 1.17 0.86 3.26 <0.0005 
SMFs 75 1.77 1.25   
Panel B  N Mean Std. Deviation t p 
General environment 
risks 
non-SMFs 54 1.30 1.04 0.09 0.932 
SMFs 75 1.28 1.09   
Immediate environment 
risks 
non-SMFs 54 0.41 0.63 -1.58 0.116 
SMFs 75 0.60 0.72   
Corporate policy risks non-SMFs 54 1.09 0.78   
SMFs 75 1.45 1.08 -2.20 0.030 
Corporate characteristics 
risks 
non-SMFs 54 0.07 0.26   
SMFs 75 0.32 0.50 -3.63 0.000 
Panel C 
Sample pairs matched on size, time-frame, and industry 
  N Mean Std. Deviation t p 
Environmental risks non-SMFs 27 1.78 1.19 -1.46 0.156 
SMFs 27 2.19 1.04   
Internal risks non-SMFs 27 1.15 0.91 -2.70 0.012 
SMFs 27 1.78 0.97   
  N Mean Std. Deviation t p 
General environment 
risks 
non-SMFs 27 1.33 1.07 -1.22 0.235 
SMFs 27 1.63 1.15   
Immediate environment 
risks 
non-SMFs 27 0.44 0.64 -0.62 0.542 
SMFs 27 0.55 0.75   
Corporate policy risks non-SMFs 27 1.04 0.85 -1.91 0.067 
SMFs 27 1.41 0.75   
Corporate characteristics 
risks 
non-SMFs 27 0.11 0.32 -2.56 0.017 
SMFs 27 0.37 0.56   
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Table 4. Servitization groups identified by cluster analysis 
 Demand Chain Services 
(N=38) 
Product Support Services 
(N=37) 
p 
Retail and distribution 
Financial 
Transportation and trucking 
Property and real estate 
Outsourcing and operating 
Consulting 
Procurement 
Design and development 
Leasing 
Systems and solutions 
Installation and implementation 
Maintenance and support 
34 
6 
2 
2 
3 
5 
2 
8 
0 
5 
2 
1 
11 
0 
0 
1 
2 
4 
3 
12 
3 
21 
15 
34 
<0.0005 
0.014 
0.253 
0.510 
0.513 
0.517 
0.487 
0.197 
0.115 
<0.0005 
<0.0005 
<0.0005 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Multiple comparisons across non-SMFs, demand chain SMFs, and product support SMFs 
Types of Risks 
non-SMFs 
N=54 
 
(1) 
Demand Chain 
SMFs 
N=38 
(2) 
Product Support 
SMFs 
N=37 
(3) 
F p 
Total risks 2.87 3.79 3.51 4.69 0.011 
Different groups (p<0.05) 2,3 1 1   
      Environmental risks 1.70 2.13 1.62 2.22 0.113 
      Different groups (p<0.06) 2 1,3 2   
          General environment risks 1.30 1.50 1.05 1.67 0.192 
          Different groups (p<0.07)  3 2   
          Immediate environment risks 0.41 0.63 0.57 1.33 0.269 
          Different groups (p<0.05)      
     Internal operating risks 1.17 1.66 1.89 5.16 0.007 
     Different groups (p<0.05) 2,3 1 1   
          Corporate policy risks 1.09 1.34 1.57 2.69 0.072 
          Different groups (p<0.05) 2,3 1 1   
          Corporate characteristics risks 0.07 0.32 0.32 5.44 0.005 
          Different groups (p<0.05) 2,3 1 1   
 
 
 
